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RESUMEN 
La industria textil moderna apareció en México tempranamente y creció 
de forma continua a lo largo del siglo xix. Sin embargo, esto no se tradujo 
en un proceso de industrialización exitoso como resultado de altos costos 
de transporte y fragilidad institucional: concepto que incluye la incertidumbre, 
la debilidad y la fragmentación institucionales. La fragilidad institucional gene-
ró una política arancelaría capturada que otorgaba bajos niveles de protección 
efectiva a la industria, un mercado financiero atrasado que limitó los recursos 
disponibles al crecimiento industrial, y un crecimiento en los costos de trans-
porte debido a las alcabalas. Los altos costos de transporte fragmentaron el 
mercado nacional y como resultado generaron una industria geográficamente 
dispersa. 
ABSTRACT 
Modern textUe manufacture appeared early in México and grew conti-
nuously through the 19**' century. Yet, it did not transíate into a successful 
industrialization process as a result of naturally endowed high transportation 
costs and institutional frailty: a concept that encompasses institutional uncer-
tainty, weakness and fragmentation. Institutional frailty generated a captured 
tariff policy that gave low effective protection to the industry, a backward 
financial market that limited resources available for industrial growth, and 
increased transportation costs through inter-state tariff barriers. High trans-
portation costs fragmented the national market and as a result, the textile 
industry grew geographicaUy dispersed. 
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INTRODUCnON * 
México is generally considered a «newly industrialized country», yet 
industrial development did not come late to México, rather, it appears 
to have taken a different less prosperous path. Mexico's first steps towards 
industrialization occurred earlier than in any other country outside of Euro-
pe and British North America, except Egypt \ Mexico's «industrialists», 
as they called themselves, established the first mechanized milis in the 
1830s; around the same time that the LoweU milis were built, and only 
twenty years after the first mechanized mili was established in the United 
States. Brazil, the other precocious industrializer in Latin America, esta-
blished its first milis in the 1840s. Yet, by 1853 it only had 8 milis with 
4500 spindles ^ while ten years earlier Mexico's textile manufacture inclu-
ded 59 milis with more than 100,000 spindles .^ In Japan, the government 
built that country's first modern cotton spitming mili in 1867, but it failed. 
The first successful private milis did not appear until a decade later '*. 
The Mexican textile industry grew in the 19th century and adopted 
new technologies of production. Mechanized faetones that used water and 
steam power replaced animal powered artisanal shops. However, this pre-
cocious industrialization did not prosper. Mexico's textile industry fell 
behind those of North America and Europe early in the 19'*^  century, and 
by century's end it was even behind those of some «underdeveloped» 
nations. By 1890, Japan's textile industry had almost twice as many spindles 
than its Mexican counterpart, and by 1905 the Brazilian textile industry 
counted more spindles than Mexico's ' . The Mexican textile industry did 
not become internationally competitive until the last decade of the 20th 
century. It thus appears that during the 19th century, México missed the 
chance to join the group of nations that profited from early industrialization. 
«Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction» .^ This 
* The author beneffited from comments on an earlier draft of this paper by John 
Coatsworth, Alberto Díaz, Nancy Koehn, Joy Langston, Carlos Manchal, Noel Maurer, Aldo 
Musacchio, John Womack and the anonymous referees from this joumal. Al! errors are 
my own. 
' Egypt had 400,000 spindles by 1834. Batou (1991), p. 185. 
' Stein (1957), p. 191. 
' Alamán (1843), Appendix, Table 5. 
' Clark (1914), p. 41 
' Takajusa, (1990), p. 94, Haber (1997), pp. 162-163. 
*• North (1990), p. 3. 
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paper explores the factors that inhibited a more prosperous industrial deve-
lopment: institutional frailty —cause and consequence of political insta-
bility— and high transportation costs. I define institutional frailty as an 
ineffícient institutional framework «that favor activities that promote redis-
tributive rather than productive activity, that créate monopolies rather than 
competitive conditions, and that restrict opportunities rather than expand 
them» ^ that has two dimensions: institutional uncertainty and institutional 
loeakness. 
Institutional uncertainty is institutional frailty in terms of time: the rules 
of the game continually change, and thus, there does not exist a reliable 
set of expectations about which present courses of actions will be rewarded 
or punished in the future. It is a product of the lacle of permanence of 
govemments in power and the lack of continuity of policies. It produces 
a risky environment that considerably reduces the time-span individuáis 
and organizations take into account to act. 
Institutional weakness is institutional frailty in terms of strength and 
scope: the rules of the game are not enforced systematically and benefit 
in a discretionary matter powerful players. Weak rulers are unable to carry 
on policies from which society would gain at the cost of particular interest 
groups of which they are easy prey. 
When institutional weakness takes place in a territorial dimensión I 
cali it institutional fragmentation. The rules of the game are not homo-
geneous throughout the nation. Weak govemments are unable to set rules 
and policies over the whole national territory from which the country would 
benefit at the cost of regional interests. Institutional fragmentation, together 
with high transportation costs, cut the nation into several regional eco-
nomies, drastically limiting the size of markets businessmen can count on. 
Through this paper I will explore these concepts grounding them on 
concrete historical events. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causes 
and the nature of Mexico's textile industry growth and retardation from 
1839 to 1879 and particularly between 1843 and 1879, a period for which 
little historical knowledge exists. It deals with the questions of why modern 
textile manufacturing appeared so early in México, and why it continued 
growing in such an unpropitious economic environment. This paper argües 
that institutional frailty and high transportation costs not only limited textile 
industry's growth, but that the way in which Mexico's early textile entre-
preneurs overéame the obstacles they faced shaped the industry's growth, 
North(1990), p. 9, 
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making it structurally different from its counterparts in the industrialized 
world. Mexican textile industry grew geographically dispersed, a characteristic 
that by itself could hinder Mexico's long term industrializatíon process. 
THE ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
Four conditions explain Mexico's early industrial growth. First, its rela-
tively large population provided the market necessary for industry to deve-
lop. Second, a tradition of artisan textile production generated political 
support for protectionist policies. Third, high transpon costs that resulted 
from the concentration of population far from the sea together with hip 
land gave textile manufactures a «natural» protection from foreign trade. 
And fourth, between 1830 and 1840 the national govemment, under the 
influence of síatesmen such as Lucas Alamán and industrialists such as 
Estevan de Antuñano provided both tariff protection and means of finance 
through a development bank, the Banco de Avío. 
In 1835 Estevan de Antuñano established La Constancia Mexicana, 
the first enduring mechanized textile mili to opérate in México .^ The Banco 
de Avío ,^ a government owned development bank ran by Lucas Alamán, 
financed it. Lucas Alamán (1792-1853) became the Minister of Interior 
and Foreign Affair in 1830. In that year he organized the creation of a 
bank for the promotion of industrialization: the «Banco de Avío para 
Fomento de la Industria Nacional.» His goals were to promote a mecha-
nized industry that could produce, at a price and quality equal to foreign 
competitors, not merely to protect the inefficient artisanal production of 
colonial times. It was clear to him that more than mere tariff protection 
would be necessary to promote industrialization. He wrote: «The purely 
prohibitive systems cannot by themselves make factories flourish; other 
elements are needed, such as an abundant population, capital, and adequate 
machinery» '°. Alamán believed that by itself the «invisible hand» was not 
going to lead to industrialization " . 
' Technically «La Aurora Yucateca» was built first, in 1833, by Pedro Sainz de Baranda. 
However, its small size and the lacle of reports of it in the Ministerio de Fomento documents, 
have made it to be rarely mentioned when talking of Mexico's industrial development, as 
Keremitsis points out. Keremitsis (1973), p. 18. See Cline (1947), pp. 30-31. 
' For an excellent study on the Banco de Avio see Potash (1983). 
'" Memoria de la secretaría de estado y del despacho de relaciones interiores y exteriores, 
1830: 29-30, in Potash (1983), p. 42. 
" Potash(1983), p. 29. 
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He devised a plan by which the total prohibition of textile imports 
would be replaced by tariffs. One fifth of the total duties accrued would 
go to form the capital of the Banco de Avío until one million pesos had 
been accumulated. The bank would lend money at low interest rates to 
those who wished to establish modern faetones. 
Alamán's Banco de Avío was a clever way to get around the vicious 
circle in which Mexican textile production was trapped. Low profits led 
to low investment, while low investment led to low profits and the inability 
to compete with foreign manufacturers. Free trade would have lowered 
profits even more, and inhibited the possibüity of national textile produc-
tion, but protection without investment became a heavy burden on the 
consumer without any compensation in terms of economic development. 
The bank tried to square the circle by translating lower protection into capital 
for investment. While the bank was never able to accumulate the planned 
capital of one million pesos, it was able to finance industrial projects until 
1840, when the bank ceased to function as an industrial loan agency. 
Despite the haphazard way the bank functioned in those unstable years, 
it carried out a machine-purchasing program. In 1830 it bought fíve cotton 
milis and two paper milis from New England tool manufacturers '^. In 
addition to these special purchase programs, the most important activity 
of the bank was lending money to prívate entrepreneurs. The Board of 
Directors of the Banco de Avío evaluated the projects submitted by the 
entrepreneurs and assigned funds accordingly. From 1830 to 1840, the 
bank gave forty loans of which thirteen went to cotton textile factories, 
while the rest financed paper milis and iron foundríes. Half of the cotton 
textile milis opened with Banco de Avío credit still operated in 1845 '^. 
Three of those milis. La Constancia Mexicana, Cocolapan, and Industríal 
Jalapeña, still functioned in 1893 '''. Viewed from this perspective, the 
impact of the Banco de Avío on Mexican industríalization seems important. 
The bank's role in the promotion of industry must not be exaggerated: 
of the fifty-nine companies Alamán lists, only six received a bank loan. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that the establishment of the first firms —^which 
did receive loans from the bank— had a positive extemality on the creation 
of the ones that came later, giving a clear signal of the govemment's com-
•' Potash(1983),p. 55. 
" Potash(1983), p. 124. 
'"• México, Dirección Nacional de Estadística (1894), «Cuadro Estadístico de la 
Industria Fabril de Hilados y Tejidos de Lana y Alodón en los Estados Uniodos Mexicanos 
formado en 1893». 
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mitment to industrialization. Moreover these milis were on larger scale 
than the median throughout the period. 
Estevan de Antuñano (1792-1847), Mexico's major industrialist of the 
time, wrote numerous pamphlets to promote the policies he considered 
the most appropriate for the growth of the textile industry. De Antuñano 
pondered the possibility that some day «the mechanical arts» of México 
would reach those of the «enlightened nations». He wrote: 
It is not only possible, but [certain that ] our faetones one day can become 
more productive for us than their factories [of the enlightened nations] 
are for them, since we will work at a lower cost than they do, because 
of the advantage that natura gives us in an immense and exuberant land 
with a benign climate (...) We are also farther from the disturbances that 
origínate in Europe and that very often jeopardize the progress of their 
industry (...) but (...) we are stiU far from the day when all this comes 
true! (...) We still have to remove many obstacles, and a great perseverance 
to prove, to achieve the apogee of happiness I have imagined.. however, 
there is nothing impossible for men when the means are provided! '^. 
Antuñano's optimism about the future of Mexican industry was not totally 
unfounded. He envisioned for México the economic development that 
actually took place in the United States. The abundance of natural resources, 
together with the protection that the Adantic ofíered from European wars 
were certainly an asset for development in the Western Hemisphere. In 1837, 
when the territory that today is Texas, California, Nevada and New México 
still belonged to México, and when México still remembered its past as the 
most prosperous Spanish colony, Antuñano's hopes were not illusory. 
At that time México had the biggest population in the Western Hemisp-
here, after the United States. In 1820 Mexico's population was of 6.5 
million inhabitants, only two-thirds of that of the United States. Brazil 
had only 4.5 million, Perú and Colombia, a little more than one million 
inhabitants, and the rest of the countries even fewer ^^ . For the textile 
industry, this meant a large market if protectionist policies were undertaken. 
Antuñano called for govemment intervention to assist industry against 
those who: 
... after having occupied their memory in leaming the principies and precepts 
of political economy, reading foreign authors, these theories have impas-
sioned them so much that they are not only persuaded that it is possible 
" De Antuñano (1837), p. 21. 
"• Maddison (1995), pp. 106-112. 
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to achieve a manufacturing economy in México (...), but they believe that 
it can be obtained, without national laws that support the first steps of 
the industry: they expect that it wül appear by itself, without more impulse 
than scarcity; and since unfortunately this is abundant in México, they deduct 
from this fact its possibility . 
He was a perfect partner for Lucas Alamán in the promotion of indus-
trial development, and the two frequently exchanged correspondence. 
When Alamán was in an important position he helped Antuñano. Meanw-
hile, Antuñano helped transíate Alamán's poÜcies into actual factories. 
Alamán's industrial policy, as Bemecker has pointed out, required stable 
political conditions over a long run, established on a basis of well organized 
public finances, an effective system of tax collection, and a gradual tran-
sition to an era of steady economic growth *^. Unfortunately, political ins-
tabiüty, cause and consequence of a permanent disorder in public finances, 
made these requirements impossible to attain in México during most of 
the 19th century ^'. In the 55 years between Independence and the Por-
fíriato, the presidency changed hands 75 times ^°. Political instability gene-
rated institutional frailty under which it was impossible for the govemment 
to cany on a cogent industrial policy. 
Constant wars put the federal govemment in permanent fiscal déficits 
which it financed through indebtment with private money lenders (agiotistas) 
and the church. From the fiscal perspective 19th century México was more 
a loóse confederation than a federal regime. Tax collection was basically 
in the hands of the states that took control of the Patronato Real de la 
Nueva España and charged indirect taxes through inter-state tariff barriers. 
The federal govemment had very few fiscal sources except some monopolies 
and foreign trade taxes. Given that México City is far away from ports, 
its control over foreign trade taxes depended more of state govemments 
than of the federal one ^'. This situation generated weak federal govem-
ments. State govemments were run by regional caciques (war-lords), such 
as Santiago Vidaurri, whose commitment to the federation that depended 
on the party in power ^^ . 
" De Antuñano (1837), p. 12, 
" Bernecker(1992), p. 254. 
" Thomson (1978), and Walter Bemecker (1992), pp. 43-109. 
* Haber, (1989), p. 21. 
' ' Díaz Cayeres (1995), p. 29. 
' ' Tyler(1973),pp. 13-40. 
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THE MEXICAN COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
FROM 1836 TO 1843. 
The existence in the early 19*^  century of a large artisan textile sector 
gave protectionism important political support ^'. Since 1829, Mexican 
govemments set tariff policies that protected textile manufactures. Howe-
ver, these protectionist measures were not part of an industrialization pro-
gram. They can be understood as the accumulation of privileges granted 
to several interest groups, which many times contradicted each other. In 
1836, representatives of the cotton-growing regions of Veracruz and Oaxaca 
successfully introduced a bilí to ban the entry of raw cotton. The textile 
manufacturers did not oppose the bilí, since domestic cotton production 
was sufficient to supply the small cotton textile industry. However, pro-
hibition of raw cotton imports very soon produced terrible consequences. 
It made no economic sense to impose tariffs both on the products and 
on the inputs of the textile industry ^'^. Three years later Antuñano wrote 
several letters to President Santa Anna, explaining the problems that the 
ban on raw cotton caused the textile industry, trying to convince him to 
ease the prohibition ^'. Antuñano asked Santa Anna not to provide partial 
permits to import cotton, since this would give an unequal advantage to 
the certain faetones in purchasing the necessary cotton ^ .^ 
Santa Anna did not listen. In 1843 he gave an exclusive privilege to 
the Sres. Agüero González y Cia. to import 60,000 quintales. The company 
had to pay the govemment six pesos per quintal, or $360,000 pesos in 
cash, within two months. Later in the same year a second permit was 
issued for 20,000 quintales under similar terms. Both permits were trans-
ferred to Cayetano Rubio, the owner of the Hércules mili, a merchant 
and a well known agiotista ^^. Santa Anna, political boss of a major cotton 
growing región, had too many commitments to cotton growers to relax 
their protection. Santa Anna himself may have been in the cotton business, 
thus having personal interests in the protection of raw cotton *^. Govem-
" Thomson (1978) and Bemecker (1992), pp. 43-109. 
" IUades(1989), p. 39. 
" Letter from Antuñano to Santa Anna, Puebla, January 22, 1843; Illades (1989), p. 12. 
'^' Letter from Antuñano to Santa Anna, n.d.; in Dlades (1989), p. 43. 
" Decree of April 12, 1843, El Observador Judicial y de Legislación, pp. 366-67; Memoria 
que el Secretario de Hacienda., presentó, 1844, p. 15 in Potash ( 1983), p. 142. 
^' Illades(1989), p. 41. 
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ments may have given import pennits to agiotistas as pait of their nego-
tiations in order to obtain further credits from them ^'. 
Lucas Alamán, extensively criticized the prohibition of raw cotton 
imports in the 1843 Report ofthe Bureau oflndustry. He wrote: 
Contrary to what those interested in the monopoiy of cotton have said, 
it is evident that the national cotton crop is not sufficient to provide the 
actual consumption for the estabiished faetones (...) From 1838 onwards 
cotton started to become scarce; and its price, which at that time was only 
16 or 17 pesos per quintal, has increased to 40 pesos (...) There has never 
been a surplus from one year to another, and very far from this, the manu-
facturers have had to stop production, or to shorten daüy production in 
order not to stop, waiting anxiously for the arrivals of the new crop . 
To Alamán, the cotton import permits that Santa Arma issued were 
better than nothing, since in their absence «the factorías would have closed 
and the industry would have collapsed. «However», he wrote: «... that 
has been only a temporary remedy, and it is always of a dangerous nature, 
since a privilege is never more than a monopoiy, and as the etymology 
of that word explains, it means richness for one and damage for all» ^\ 
Raw cotton made up a very important percentage of production costs 
for textile milis. The data presented by Alamán suggests that cotton repre-
sented from fifty to sixty percent of production costs, while labor embodied 
about 30% of total costs. An estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production 
function using data for the industry in 1893 indicates a share of raw cotton 
in total costs of 72% ^ .^ 
" Bemecker (1992), pp. 226, 265. 
'" Alamán (1843), pp. 22-23. 
" Alamán (1843), p. 24. 
" A least squares estimation of a Cobb-Douglas production function using data for 
89 factories operating in México in 1893 gives the following results: 
Dependent Variable is LQ 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat 2-Tail Sig. 
C 0.8226 0.2295 3.5838 0.0007 
LK 0.1167 0.0245 4.7558 0.0000 
LL 0.1796 0.0374 4.7978 0.0000 
LM 0.7241 0.0303 23.909 0.0000 
LF 0.0165 0.0215 0.7651 0.4471 
R-Squared: 0.984 ^ ^ 
Where LQ is the valué of total production, LK is the valué of capital, LL is the valué 
of labor employed, LM is the valué of cotton consumed and LF is the valué of fuel consumed. 
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Textile industriaÜsts suffered special cotton import licenses arbitrarily 
granted by the govemment to a privüeged few. They also had to withstand 
the granting of licenses for the importation of manufactured textiles. The 
precarious fiscal situation of the Mexican govemments made their com-
mitment to protect textile manufactures very vulnerable. In 1841, for exam-
ple, in order to finance the war against Texas, General Mariano Arista 
authorized the sale of special import licenses for textile manufactures. Gui-
llermo Drusina and Cayetano Rubio purchased them over the harsh oppo-
sition of other textile producers ^^ . Furthermore, textile manufacturers often 
complained of the prevalence of smuggling which further Hmited their 
markets ^''. 
We can blame protectionism undertaken of Mexican govemments in 
this period on institutional frailty. Their fiscal and military weakness and 
the concomitant constant change of govemment in power made it incapable 
of undertaking a trade policy focused on the promotion of industry. The 
weakness of national govemments, both in terms of their capacity to imple-
ment policies and in terms of their lack of control of regional govemments, 
made smuggling unavoidable. For govemments in this period, short-term 
objectives always reigned over long-term ones. Given the precarious situa-
tion govemment faced, it was not in a situation to foster policies that 
would have increased govemment revenues in the long mn, such as pro-
moting industry and economic growth. They needed resources immediately 
in order to survive, and tried to obtain them at whatever cost was necessary. 
Another problem the textile industry faced in this period was the back-
wardness of financial institutions. Apart from the Banco de Avío, which 
closed its doors in 1840, there was no institutional lending to industry 
until the 1880s. Only after 1864 did a mdimentary banking system with 
specialized institutions and stable practices begin to develop in México. 
By 1884 only eight banks were in operation in México. Stephen Haber 
has studied the pernicious effect that the poor development of banking 
had on textile industry's growth and structure during the Porfíriato, when 
a financial system began to develop ^'. The limits it set on industrial growth 
before 1880 must have been even larger. 
Chcxjsing a Cobb Doublas function assumes a factor substitution elasticity equal to one. 
A trans-log functiton could be estimated to avoid this problem but there is insufficient 
data to do so. 
" Walker(1991), p. 200. 
'•• Bemecker (1992), pp. 200, 215, and 221. 
" Haber (1997), pp. 161-171. 
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Interest rates were exorbitantly high and fluctuated unpredictably, there 
were no banking institutions and there was no formal stock market. Indus-
trialists had to rely on informal mechanisms of raising capital, in most 
cases based on kinship networks of credit. Studies of particular milis during 
this era tell of the serious difficulties businessmen faced obtaining credit, 
which frequently drove them to bankruptcy '^. Successful entrepreneurs 
were those who undertook speculative activities as part of their businesses, 
such as money lending to the govemment. Agiotistas such as Cayetano 
Rubio, Pedro Berges de Zúñiga and Manuel Escanden became the major 
textile-mill owners by mid-nineteenth century. Their position as money len-
ders gave them two major assets other businessmen lacked: liquidity and 
a privileged position to negotiate concessions from the govemment, such 
as raw cotton import permits ^^ . With these two aces in hand they were 
able to liquídate other competitors, and later to buy their milis at cheap 
pnces, or simply obtain them when they defaulted their debts. We can 
understand this situation as one in which «the rules of the game» rewarded 
courses of action that were not those from which society benefited the 
most. 
Mexico's financial system lagged behind not only those of developed 
countries, such as the United States, but also to those of other Latin Ame-
rican countries such as Brazil, Argentina, or Chile. Institutional frailty 
explains this relative backwardness. According to Carlos Manchal, the ins-
tability of Mexican financial markets and the difficulties in the development 
of modem capital markets during the greater part of the nineteenth century 
were mainly the result of the state's fiscal and credit policies ^^ . Two basic 
preconditions for the development of capital markets were not present 
in nineteenth century México: the stabilization and broadening of 
short-term money-markets and the creation of a relatively open, intemal 
market for public securities''. These two conditions could not exist until 
the Mexican government's fiscal resources allowed it to pay its debts regu-
larly. Political instability, prevalent through this period played against 
govemments' fiscal health, and was also a result of it''°. 
In addition to the problems industrial expansión faced from the 
supply-side, the slow growth of domestic demand must also have placed 
"• Trujillo (1997), p. 254-255, and Hades (1989), pp. 44-46. 
" Bemecker(1992), pp. 183-190. 
'* Manchal (1997), p. 119. 
" Marichal(1997), p. 119. 
* Further work needs to be undertaken in order to evalúate the impact of financial 
backwardness on the textile industry during the pre-Porfirian 19* century. 
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an important constraint on the growth of the textile industry. In the United 
States, demand changes accounted for more than half of the expansión 
of the industry between 1815 and 1833, in which sales increased by a 
15.4% average rate per year. This was the result of rapid population growth, 
averaging 3% a year over the 1815-1840 period, the rising income levéis 
enjoyed by the growing population, and transportation improvements which 
further increased demand for textiles by reducing the difference between 
pnces at the factory gate and those consumers actually faced '". In México 
demand must have remained stagnant as population grew slowly between 
1800 and 1845 at an average annual rate of 0.51%, and income per capita 
decreased at the average annual rate of 0.6% during that period (See Table 
1). No transportation improvements were carried on during these years. 
TABLE 1 
Population and Income 
(average annual rate of growth) 
_ , . Income Total 
Population „ . 
per Capita Income 
1800-1845 0.51% -0.60% -0.10% 
1845-1860 0.46% -0.95% -0.49% 
1860-1877 1.33% 1.48% 2.43% 
1877-1895 1.90% 2.28% 3.75% 
SouRCES: Coatsworth (1990), p. 83. 
In spite of these problems, the cotton industry was able to grow during 
this period. Table 2 presents some of the data given by Alamán to prove 
his point, and shows a pattem of continuous growth in the textile industry. 
From 1837 to 1845, cloth production increased by an extraordinary 1361%. 
Jan Bazant's calculations show that the Mexican textile industry of those 
years compared relatively well in terms of efficiency with the British and 
American industries. According to the Semanario de la Industria Mexicana, 
between 1841 and 1842 capital-labor ratios in the Mexican textile industry 
were 20 spindles per worker, around the same as for American workers 
in 1830 ^^. However, the prices of the products were very different from 
•" Atack and Passell (1994), pp. 185-188. 
*^ By 1840 each American worker handled 31 spindles on average, and 38 spindles 
in 1850. Jan Bazant (1964), pp. 55-56 
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TABLE2 
Growth ofthe Mexican Cotton Textile Industry 
y No. of No. Active Yam Cloth Pieces 
Faetones Spindles (tons) (lOOO's) 
1837 45 
1838 29 109 
1839 15 125 
1840 257 88 
1841 467 196 
1842 358 218 
1843 59 106,708 3,738 327 
1844 112,188 508 
1845 55 113,813 1,317 657 
1853 3,348 875 
1850-1857 48 119,278 3,351 727 
1862 57 133,122 3,615 1,259 
1879 89 253,594 2,925 3,255 
SouRCES: Alamán (1843), Table No. 5, Alamán (1846), Tables Nos. 2, 3, 4; México, 
Ministerio de Fomento (1857); Pérez Hernández (1862), pp. 136-139; Busto (1880); México, 
Dirección General de Estadística (1894). Note: A cloth piece (pieza de manta) was a piece 
of unbleached cloth one vara wide and between 30 and 36 varas long. A vara equals 0.8359 
meters. Bazant (1964), pp. 43-44. 
those of the United States. A report on México published in 1846 that 
«cotton goods which sell in the United States for six cents per yard, are 
worth thirty cents in México» ^^. According to the author of that report, 
«this results from the high price of the raw material, which sells from 
forty to fifty cents per pound, and from the circumstance that all the machi-
nery is imported and transported by land at an enormous costs; and also 
to the difficulty and delay of repairing it, when it breaks down» '*'*. 
Bazant's calculations present the cotton industry as a profitable one. 
They show that in 1843 the profit rates for the industry as a whole were 
10% per piece of cloth produced, while for La Constancia they were 20% 
per piece of cloth ^^. However, Walker's study of the Miraflores mili sug-
cent 
« Famham (1846), p. 29. 
"' Famham (1846), p. 29. 
•" Bazant (1964), pp. 64-72. Interests rates in the period were around 10 to 12 per 
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gests that the prosperity of a textile mili depended more on its owners 
speculation in the cotton market than on its productivity ''^ . 
GROWTH OF MEXICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRYFROM 1843 TO 1879 
The period between 1846 and 1867 was particularly difficult for México. 
Even the country's survival carne into question. In 1846 México lost half 
of its territory to the United States. Furthermore, in 1847 a secessionist 
civil war broke out in the state of Yucatán that was not quelled until the 
1850s. Then, from 1857 to 1860, the so called «Three Years War» between 
Liberáis and Conservatives caused much destruction. In 1862, Napoleón 
III's troops landed in Veracruz. In 1864 Mexican Conservatives gave Maxi-
milian the throne of México, and conflict continued until 1867, when the 
Liberáis deposed Maximilian. Peace was then more or less reestablished, 
though not entirely. In 1876 Porfirio Díaz seized power to rule the country 
until 1910. 
According to Jan Bazant, Dawn Keremitsis, and Walther Bernecker, 
the modem textile cotton industry was formed in only some fifteen years, 
between 1830-1845, and by the mid 1850's the highest point of industrial 
expansión was reached ''^ . After that, progress became far slower, stopping 
before the end of the decade, not to resume until 1880. Yet, Mexican 
imports of capital goods and machinery from 1845 to 1879, as shown 
in Figure 1, tell a story of more industrialization during this period than 
in the supposed heyday of the industry between 1839 and 1845 ''*. 
For Keremtisis the survival of the textile industry during these years 
of foreign invasions, a major civil war, and slow-growing population was 
in itself remarkable ''^ . It is even more remarkable that in fact the industry 
actually grew. The total number of looms and spindles grew by 138% and 
241% respectively between 1843 and 1879. At least part of this growth 
*• Walker(1991),pp. 183-219. 
" Bazant (1964), p. 31, Keremitsis (1973), p. 55, and Bemecker (1992), p. 251. 
'"' In 1862 Mexican imports of British products accounted for 43% of total imports. 
(Imports from the U.S. and Franca were each of them 17% of total imports). Pérez 
Hernández, (1862), p. 154. Imports from the U.K. must have represented more than 43% 
of total imports of raw iron and machinery early in the century, since the United States 
and France were not competitive with the U.K., then in these products. Yet, as the century 
advanced, the share of imports of these kinds from the United States and Germany grew. 
In 1888-89, 54% of the iron and steel imponed by México carne from the U.S., 22% from 
Great Britain, 15% from Germany and 7% from France. García Cubas (1893), pp. 62-65. 
' ' Keremitsis (1973), p. 55. 
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FIGURE 1 
Machinery and Mtllwork imported by México from the UK (£.) 
20,000 
O O O O O O O O í S C O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O C O C a ^ O ^ O ^ ^ 
SouRCE: U.K. Parliamentary Documents, Retum to an Order of the Honourable The 
House of Commons Several Issues. 
took place between 1843 and 1862 when the number of spindles increased 
by 25% (See Table 2). Furthermore, the average firm grew, increasing 
its number of spindles by 58% and its number of looms by 126%. But 
the industry grew more because the number of firms increased, rather 
than because of growth in the size of firms. 
In spite of their growth, the average size of Mexican milis fell below 
their American counterparts. In 1843, Mexican milis, in terms of spindles 
per mili, were not much smaller than United States firms in 1831. In con-
trast, by 1879, average spindles per mili in the Mexican industry were 
only 20% of what American milis had on average in 1880 "*. 
'" However, if one compares Mexican milis to factories in the South and West of 
the United States, the differences are less pronounced. U.S. 10* Census 1880, Report 
of Manufactures of the United States, [Caroll, Wright], Report on the Factory System of 
the United States, June V 1880. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
The cotton textile industry not only grew between 1843 and 1879, 
it also modernized. As we have seen, the industry successfully integrated 
spinning and weaving. Even more important was the complete transfor-
mation in the sources of power used. Table 3 shows that in 1843, 37% 
of the firms used men or mules as their source of power; only 3% ran 
on steam. By 1878 no textile mili operated with animal power. Instead, 
64% of the faetones employed steam power. Of the total manta produced, 
only 2% was made using steam in 1843, but 70% in 1878. While in 1843 
only 56% of the firm were using water power, by 1878 this figure rose 
to 91%. More than half of the firms (55%) combined steam and water 
power. 
To have some measure of the different efficiency of the various sources 
of power, I calculated the average valué of production, per peso of labor, 
in 1843. Human-powered milis produced 2.75 pesos, steam-powered 3.05 
pesos, mule-powered 3.43 and water-powered 4.27 pesos, per peso of 
labor ' ' . Using steam as a solé source of power was prohibitively expensive 
since the lack of coal forced firms to burn wood. Before the introduction 
of electricity, the best combination of power sources in México was steam 
and water. Water was used most of the time, but it was complemented 
with steam during the dry season. These cost estimates explain why power 
sources changad to the prevalent use of a combination of water and steam 
in 1878. 
Technological progress appears to have had a positive impact on mili 
productivity levéis. Although productivity has not been measured for the 
specifíc period studied here, Haber's and Razo's measurements of labor 
productivity and total factor productivity '^ for the period 1850 to 1890 
indícate that they increased by 3.3% and 2.6% respectively per year when 
production is measured by physical output '^. 
" The calculation for steam is not very reliable because there was only one observation. 
" Labor productivity is output produced per worker, total factor productivity is output 
produced per units of several inputs, weighted by their shares in the production process. 
In Razo's and Haber's calculation of total factor productivity for the textile industry inputs 
considered are: capital, measured by the number of spindles, and labor, measured by the 
number of workers. Output is measured by the meters of cloth produced, for the estimates 
here quoted. 
" Razo and Haber (1998), p. 18. 
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TABLE3 
Mexican Textile Industry Energy Sources (1843-1878) 
Firms Spindles 
(%) (%) 
1843 
As a percentage of total 
Men 13.6 O 
Mules 23.7 5.8 
Water 55.9 84.5 
Steam 3.4 2.3 
Water & Steam. O O 
N/A 3.4 7.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
1878 
As a percentage o( total 
Men O O 
Mules O O 
Water 36.0 24.1 
Steam 9.0 7.2 
Water & Steam. 55.1 68.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
SOURCES: Alamán (1843) and Busto (1880). 
Looms 
(%) 
Cloth 
(%) 
Yam 
(%) 
30.7 
16.5 
46.3 
1.8 
0 
4.6 
100.0 
0 
0 
27.8 
10.7 
61.5 
100.0 
33.1 
20.8 
43.7 
2.3 
0 
0 
100.0 
0 
0 
29.9 
12.8 
57.3 
100.0 
0 
6.8 
83.3 
3.3 
0 
6.6 
100.0 
0 
0 
55.0 
2.1 
42.9 
100.0 
EXPLAINING GROWTH BEIWEEN 1843 AND 1879 
Industrial growth between 1843 and 1878 ¡s difficult to explain given 
the difficult economic and political conditions then. The central govem-
ment's lack of control and its inability to guarantee security, even on the 
most important highways, greatly increased transportation costs. Roads were 
bandit-infested. Accounts of the period tell, for example, that in one single 
day in 1861, the stagecoach from México City to Puebla was robbed three 
times. In 1865, in two weeks, there were four major robberies along the 
highway from Orizaba, Veracruz, to México City. Apparently, members 
of the army themselves robbed like bandits ''*. 
Govemment's inability to provide security forced firms to assume con-
siderable costs in protecting their property by themselves. From 1869 to 
'' Haber(1989),pp. 21-22, 
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1870, Col. Albert S. Evans traveled through México visiting several textile 
faetones. According to his account, La Purísima Concepción, and Hércules, 
both in the state of Querétaro, stood in an «enclosure, with high walls 
(...) and [ were] guarded all the time by watchmen in full military uniform, 
armed and drilled in the best modern style» ' ' . 
Additionally, historians have considered that tariff policy changed for 
the worse. «The friendly attitude of the Mexican government toward 
industry which characterized the period from 1830 to 1845 also was con-
siderably modified between 1850 and 1880» '^. From 1855 on, the country 
was mostly under Liberal rule. The Liberáis advocated freedom of trade 
and the promotion of the interests of the merchant and the capitalist agri-
cultural class, decentralization and limitation of the national government, 
and the elimination of the «feudal» privileges of the church and the mili-
tary '^. Table 3 shows that there was a reduction in the tariffs on cotton 
manufactures in 1856 '*. However, the effect of this reduction was not 
unambiguously negative for the textile industry, as Keremitsis seems to 
believe, since the government also removed the prohibition on the imports 
of raw cotton. 
A raw estímate of the effects of the Liberal's reduction on tariffs from 
1855 to 1856 shows its net effect was positive. Li order to estímate the 
impact of the tariff change, we need to calcúlate the difference between 
the drop in prices of manufactured goods caused by the tariff reduction, 
and the fall in production costs that the decrease in the tariff for raw 
cotton generated. In 1843 the price of a piece oí manta (of 30 varas) was 
$7 .00" . Therefore, the reduction in duty from $0.10 to $.03 per vara 
of cotton cloth implies that the ad valorem duty changed from 43% to 
13%. This reduction in the duty would have meant that cloth prices in 
México dropped 21%. In 1843, a year when raw cotton imports were pro-
hibited, the average price of a quintal oí cotton was $34 ^ . Alamán in 
the Report of 1845 wrote that the price of a quintal oí foreign cotton 
with no duty in Veracruz was $13.37, and $18.37 in México City ^'. Repla-
cing prohibiton with a tariff of $1.50 per quintal of raw cotton would 
reduce the price from $34 to $17.37 (average price), which implies a drop 
of 49% in the price of cotton. 
" Evans(1879), p. 222. 
"• Keremitsis (1973), pp. 41-42. 
" Keremitsis(1973), p. 38. 
" This was pointed out by Cosío Villegas (1932), pp. 13, 43, and 92. 
" Alamán (1843), p. 21 and Bazant (1964), p. 65. 
"' Bazant, (1964) p. 65. One quintal is equal to 100 pounds. 
<•' Alamán(1846), p. 48. 
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In order to calcúlate the change in the effective protection the two 
tariff regimes granted, we need to know the percentage of raw cotton 
in total production costs of manufactured textile goods. If we assume that 
cotton accounted for 72% of costs —as the regressions on the 1893 data 
show— then the Liberal tariff change would have generated a 35.2% reduc-
tion in the costs of manufacturing cotton textiles ^^ . If we consider Jan 
Bazant's estimates, in which cotton accounts for 47.6% of costs, then the 
tariff reduction would have diminished the cost of cotton manufactures 
by 23.3%. In the first case, profits for the textile industry would have 
increased by 14.2%, and in the second case by 2.3%. This shows that 
tariff reduction did not hurt the textile industry, but most Hkely helped 
it. It suggests that a bad protectionist policy can be worse for industrial 
development than a more liberal one. 
In addition, the American Civil War had a positive effect on the Mexi-
can cotton textile industry, since it by increased the price of international 
cotton manufactures and decreased the price of raw cotton. The blockade 
of the South by the Union —effective in Texas in mid 1861— forced 
the Confederates to channel cotton exports through the Mexican border. 
From 1861 to 1865 millions of bales of cotton crossed through the Browns-
ville-Matamoros, Eagle Pass-Piedras Negras and Laredo-Nuevo Laredo 
border posts ^^ . It was then re-exported through the port of Bagdad (near 
Matamoros). This trade generated enormous profits among Mexican mer-
chants and rapid growth in the Northeast ^ . Monterrey became a «free 
depot of cotton,» in that any number of bales could be deposited there 
with a duty paid only upon shipment to Matamoros or towards the interior; 
the city owed its future prosperity to its growth in this period ^'. 
The increased supply of raw cotton and the increased demand for cotton 
manufactures from the embattled American South made it possible for 
Mexican textile milis to export their products. In 1861-62, the Ibernia 
factory in Saltillo produced approximately «11,500 pieces of common 
brown sheeting called manta, which were sold to the Southerners for $4.50 
" The production function that carne out of a regression on the 1893 data showed 
that capital accounted for 11% of the costs, Labor for 17%, Cotton for 72% and Fuel 
for 1%. (See footnote 32). 
" Tyler(1973), p. 121. 
" Cerutti (1992), pp. 74-87. 
" Tyler(1973), p. 110. 
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each» ^. From importing almost six million pounds in 1858, México expor-
ted to the United States five million pounds in 1861, and even more to 
the United Kingdom. In 1864, the United States (the North) imponed 
fifteen million pounds of cotton from México, which represented 56% of 
its total raw cotton imports ^^. 
Thomas Schoonover is right in believing that the American Civil War 
had positive effects on the Mexican textile industry *^. However, he is wrong 
in thinking that the cotton exported by México to the United States in 
this period was grown in México ^'. A simple comparison of the figures 
for cotton exports with those for cotton production shows that the dramatic 
growth in cotton production in México that would have been necessary 
to export such quantities was simply impossible, given that the country 
was not even self sufficient in cotton by 1860. The difference between 
Mexico's textile milis' raw cotton consumption and national production 
was of approximately 4 million pounds in 1845 and 2.5 million pounds 
in 1859 ™. Furthermore, sufficient Information exists that México was 
importing vast amounts of cotton from the South ^^ 
Furthermore domestic demand for the period 1843-1877 must have 
increased, giving an additional boost to textiles' production. While popu-
lation grew at even a lower rate from 1845 to 1860 than in the previous 
45 years, its pace of growth considerably raised from 1860 to 1877. Income 
per capita, which according to Coatsworth's estimates continued to fall 
from 1845 to 1860, began to recover after that date growing at an average 
rate of 1.48% from 1860 to 1877 (See Table 1). On average, population 
grew by 0.90% and income per capita by 0.33% from 1845 to 1877. 
THE GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPERSED NATURE 
OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH 
The Mexican textile industry's growth between 1843 and 1879 was 
accompanied by regional dispersión. In 1843, 64% of the firms (57% of 
** Charles Lempriere, Notes i» México in 1861 and 1862: Politically and Socially 
Considered (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1862), p. 133, in 
Tyler (1973), p. 110. 
" U. S. Treasury. Commerce and Navigation Reports. Several issues and U.K. 
Parliamentary Documents, Retum to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons. 
Several Issues. 
^ Schoonover (1992), pp. 86-109. 
'•'' Evans (1879), p. 64. 
™ Evans(1879), p. 64. 
" Tyler (1973), pp. 98-128. 
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spindles and 65% of looms) were located in México City, the state of 
México, and Puebla. By 1879 only 33% (46% of spindles, 44% of looms) 
were located there. In 1843 there were firms in only eight states, whereas 
by 1879 almost every state had its own fírm. The regional dispersión of 
the industry was well underway before 1862 ^^ . 
Mexico's geography, devoid of navigable rivers and full of mountains, 
made transportation very difficult ^^ . The relatively high transportation costs 
in México explains the geographical dispersión of the Mexican textile 
industry during its early development. Most transportation was carried on 
by mules and ox-carts until the 1880's. In addition to the problems caused 
by nature, inter-state tariffs —the alcabalas— raised transportation costs 
even more. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of alcabalas as an 
obstacle to economic growth. When in February 1852 the governor of 
the state of Veracruz reestablished the alcabalas, abolished since 1847, mer-
chants complained harshly. A letter with more than a hundred signatures 
sent by the «Merchants of Drizaba» to the Congress of the State of Vera-
cruz declared: 
... when the Spanish domination ended, the system of indirect taxes remained 
in practice, despite the considerable expenditures that it demands, and that 
the arbitrariness and vexations that it brings are very opposed to the liberal 
system that the RepubUc adopted; since we were used to it, and since the 
doctrines of economists had not circulated but among a very few number 
of Mexicans, the people said nothing and paid the indirect taxes to which 
it was used to. But later (...) it started to claim for a reform of the public 
finance system (...). In effect in the year of 1847 the people of Veracruz 
not being able to stand the arrogance and haughtiness of the [alcabala] 
guards, the abuses and frauds of all the employees, and not being able 
anymore to see with indifference the great cost that demands the collection 
of the indirect taxes, asked with energy that these were substituted by another 
system less expensive and more in accordance with the principies of freedom 
that rule us. 
In effect (...) Don Juan Soto, then governor of the state, had the glory 
of being the first in destroying the indirect taxes and freeing the people 
of Veracruz from the burdens of such a cosdy system. In that period, even 
though we were experimenting the disturbances that come with a foreign 
war, as the hindrances to which commerce was subject ceased, and as the 
73 
Alamán (1843), Aiamán (1846), Pérez Hernández (1862) and Busto (1880). 
Mexico's high transportation costs are evident in Coatsworth's measurements of 
raüroad social savings in México, especially when compared to the small effect of railroads 
that Fogel found for the United States. See Coatsworth (1990b), p. 195 and Fogel (1964), 
pp. 217-220. 
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means to txade were facilitated, a great movement was generated, several 
commercial establishments appeared (...). The war widí the United States 
ended and as the alcabalas to trade were not reestablished, it became a 
source of public richness that prospered day to day, in such a way, that 
in the localities where befóte there was only stagnation and misery, later 
we could see active movement and abundance. With the abolition of the 
alcabalas (...) the people of Veracruz had the satisfaction of seeing the expen-
ditures of the state reduced to almost half of what they were before (...). 
But unfortunately when all the Veracruzans looked with satisfaction this 
gratifying picture that appeared in every town of the state, a new law rees-
tablishing the hated alcabalas, came to throw to the ground trade and to 
end the hopes of prosperity and growth . 
In the questionnaire Emiliano Busto sent to several manufacturing com-
panies in 1877, entrepreneurs replied that alcabalas were the single most 
damaging pohcy affecting their firms. The owner of La Estrella mili in 
Coahuila, for example, wrote: »the alcabalas are a true gangrene to the 
social body, something even more dangerous than the turbulence to which 
we are prey so frequently, and if they are not suppressed, they will crush 
the few industries that some few daring men, who want to see their country 
full of factories and their fellow citizens employed (...), support» ^'. Despite 
the opposition, the alcabalas were not abolished until 1896, although for-
mally prohibited by the 1857 Constitution. Even though it was evident 
that the existence of inter-state barriers greatly damaged economic growth, 
governments could not abolish them due to institutional weakness and 
fragmentation. 
Transportation costs derived from nature, from insecurity on the roads, 
and from alcabalas limited the markets accessible to firms, often reducing 
them to only the state in which they operated. High transportation costs 
and inter-state tariffs that reduced market size make for a more dispersed 
pattem of firms. This is exactly the pattem of industrialization that we 
find in México ''^ . 
In 1843, when there were very few milis, the industry appeared more 
concentrated than later when there were more factories. By 1879, the 
''' Archivo Municipal de Orizaba, Box 2-68, 1952, «Exposición que los Comerciantes' 
de Orizaba elevan al H. Congreso del Estado solicitando la estincíón del derecho de 
alcabalas», June 2, 1852. 
" Busto (1980), Volume H, p. 319. 
The extraordinary dispersión of the Mexican cotton industry could also have resulted 
irom the type of power sources it most conveniently used. The use of water as a source 
of water power together with the use of wood as fuel could explain a dispersed pattem 
of location generated by milis establishing in sites cióse to water sources and forests. If 
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industry had dispersed in a flat pattem all over the country. As railroads 
were opened, the industry re-concentrated, but never as much as the Ame-
rican industry did (see Figures 2 and 3) ^^ . The geographically scattered 
nature of Mexico's textile industry development contrasted not only with 
that of the United States but also with that of Great Britain, where the 
industry also grew in a more regionally concentrated pattem *^. 
FIGURE 2 
Lorenz curves for the Mexican Cotton Textile Industry 
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Percentage of Population 
SouRCE: See Tables 2, 4, and 12. 
Regional dispersión demonstrates the diffused nature of the national 
market. Regions with comparative advantages over others in terms of cot-
ton, energy, and labor costs did not concéntrate the industry as they did 
in the United States. Relatively efficient milis coexisted with very inefficient 
ones because high transport costs provided protected markets for relatively 
inefficient or less than optimally sized firms. Furthermore, regional dis-
this had happened the industry would have located in those regions where water power 
and wood were cheaper, which is not what evidence for the Mexican textile industry shows. 
^' From 1880 to 1930 the American industry shifted from New England to the south 
and appeared to be dispersing, but by 1930 it had concentrated to the 1880 level. See: 
Kane{1988),p. 1-3. 
'* For a long period of time much of the textile industry was concentrated in New 
England in the United States and in Lancashire in England. Even when the American textile 
industry moved south, it never moved west, and generally remained more concentrated 
than its Mexican counterpart. 
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FIGURE 3 
Lorenz curves for the United States Cotton Textile Industry 
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SouRCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, V^port of Manufactures, 
1880: 10-15, 24-37. 
persion reduced the extemalities a «big push» could have generated if 
the industry had sufficiently accumulated in particular regions ^^ . 
Cultivation of cotton in México followed a similar pattem of geograp-
hical distribution to that of the textile industry; dispersión from 1843 to 
1879, concentration afterwards (See Figure 4). Cultivation of cotton was 
always more concentrated geographically than the textile industry because 
suitable locations for the cultivation of cotton are generally more limitad 
than those required for the establishment of miUs. Yet, it did not pose 
a limit to the dispersión of the industry. While some regions must have 
been more appropriate than others for cotton growing, high transportation 
costs made it profitable to produce it in a wide array of regions in order 
to supply the local milis. Thus, cotton cultivation dispersed from being 
cultivated in only five states in 1843, to been grown in twelve states by 
1879. The share produced in Veracruz, where cotton was mostly grown, 
diminished from 52% to 42% in this period. 
Reduction in transportation costs generated a more radical transfor-
ination in cotton production than in textile manufactures in terms of the 
geographical distribution of production. After 1892, between 80% and 90% 
of cotton produced in México was grown in La Laguna district, a región 
See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), pp. 1003-1025. 
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FIGURE 4 
Lorenz Curves for Cultivation ofCotton in México 
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0.7 0.8 0.9 
SouRCES: Alamán (1843), Tables 3 and 4, Busto (1879), Table 30, Clark (1909), p. 28. 
between Durango and Coahuila connected to the rest of the country in 
1888 by the Central Railway Company *°. Once railways were built, irri-
gation improvements, together with the introduction of the American cotton 
seed, allowed this región to profít from its comparative advantages for 
cotton production, that included climatic conditions unsuitable for the 
development of the boíl weevil that damaged cotton crops elsewhere in 
México *'. 
Why did the industry's geographic concentration change so little after 
railroads were built, and alcabalas abolished, particularly when compared 
to cotton cultivation? Changes in industrial locaÜzation tend to take place 
very slowly as a result of «leaming by doing» and the capital loss companies 
have to incur in order to move, which are greater than those experienced 
in agriculture. Thus, path-dependency plays a large role in industrial loca-
lization. In 1879, buildings represented 54% of the repcrted valué of all 
textile milis, the rest was the valué of its machinery *^ . This capital would 
have been lost if milis were relocated. Given that müls had already been 
established, they continued operating, unless great location disadvantages 
existed that made them go bankrupt. There was no «boll-weevil» in cotton 
manufacturing that forced ill-Iocated textile milis to go out of business. 
*" Plana (1996), pp. 123-128, Clark (1909), p. 27. 
«' Plana (1996), pp. 219-246, Clark (1909), pp. 27-33. 
«^  Busto (1879), Table 2, pp. 1-4. 
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In the American textile industry relocation from the New England to 
the South took place very slowly. As Gavin Wright explains «Even after 
the acceleration of the 1870s, it took at least a half-century for the South 
to gain the market position made possible by the labor-cost advantage» *'. 
The northem industry continued to grow, although at a slower rate than 
in the South. Its collapse did not become visible until the eariy 1920's, 
when the number of milis began to decline sharply ^. This indicates how 
slowly locational advantages make an industry move away from those 
regions where investment is already in place. Further work needs to be 
undertaken in order to answer this question fully. 
CONCLUSIÓN 
The eariy appearance of Mexican cotton textile industry and its steady 
growth throughout the 19th century, tell us of the possibility of a successful 
industrialization process in México in that period. Three conditions that 
were not present in the rest of Latin America explain its earlier industrial 
growth. First, its relatively large population, concentrated in the center 
of a mountainous country far away from the sea-ports, that provided the 
market necessary for industry to develop. Second, a tradition in the artisanal 
textile production which generated political support for protectionist poli-
cies. And third, a historical juncture between 1830 and 1840 when govem-
ment, under the influence of statesmen such as Lucas Alamán, and indus-
trialists such as Estevan de Antuñano, provided both tariff protection and 
means of finance for the textile industry through a development bank, 
the Banco de Avío. 
From 1830 to 1879 Mexican textile industry changed from production 
carried on using hand spindles and looms from the Colonial era, to water 
and steam powered machinery. Furthermore, the industry vertically inte-
grated the spinning and weaving processes in the decades between 1843 
and 1879. Contrary to the commonly held views, the growth of the industry 
did not end around 1845 but continued through 1879, fostered in part 
by the effects of the American Civil War on the Mexican economy. Growth • 
occurred even in the tumultuous period from 1843 to 1862. Yet despite 
this growth, the Mexican textile industry did not profit from its eariy esta-
blishment and fell behind its counterparts in the rest of the world. 
" Wright (1986), p. 124. 
** Kane (1988), pp. 155-156. 
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Institutional frailty made Mexican governments unable to provide a 
coherent industrial policy, as diat designed by Alamán. Mexican govern-
ments could not even provide the basic ingredient for economic deve-
lopment: a «Rule of Law» that set efficient property rights *^ . Mexican 
governments, in permanent financial need, generated an institutional fra-
mework in which individual benefits and costs did not equate social ones *^ . 
Entrepreneurs who succeeded, such as Cayetano Rubio, were those capable 
of obtaining rents and privileges from the govemment, not those, such 
as Estevan de Antuñano, who made investments in order to increase pro-
ductivity levéis. 
Institutional frailty, in terms of time, strength and scope, prevented 
govemment from undertaking a protectionist policy that could foster indus-
trial development. As long as a specific tariff schedule was not reÜable 
in the long run, entrepreneurs could not base their investment decisions 
on it. Trade policy became an instrument by which governments gave mono-
poly power to particular groups that would give them political and financial 
support, such as the agiotistas, govemment lenders to whom the govemment 
sold raw cotton import permits. Finally, governments were unable to pre-
vent smuggling, which limited their abiÜty to grant actual protection to 
industry. 
Protectionist policy, as it was undertook by Mexican governments in 
early 19* century, harmed industry more than it helped it. The liberal 
reduction of import duties on raw cotton and cotton manufactures of 1856, 
had a positive effect over textile industry, contrary to what historians until 
now have believed. Since raw cotton accounted for the majority costs for 
the textile industry, its tariff reduction compensated for the reduction in 
the duty on cotton manufactures. 
There is perhaps no other historical episode better suited to refute 
the «dependentist» view of the economic history of Latin America than 
the history of the Mexican textile industry during the early 19* century. 
México did not suffer from a lack of protection to its industry. However, 
as the history of Mexican textiles shows, a badly undertaken protectionist 
policy can be as harmfial to industrial development as lack of protection 
can be. 
Institutional frailty hindered the development of financial markets in 
México in the 19* century. After the Banco de Avío closed its doors in 
" North(1994), p. 581. 
"" North(1991), pp. 11-13. 
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1842, there was no institutional lending to industry until the 1880s. Indus-
trialists had to rely on informal mechanisms of raising capital, in most 
cases based on kinship networks of credit. Successful entrepreneurs were 
those who undertook speculative activities as part of their business such 
as money-lending to the government. The instability and underdevelopment 
of financial markets was the result of the lack of two preconditions the 
government was not able to meet due to its permanent fiscal déficits and 
constant debt defaults: the stabilization and broadening of short-term 
money-markets, and the creation of a relatively open intemal market for 
public securities ^^ . 
Institutional frailty limited Mexico's possibility to diminish its high trans-
portation costs by an earlier introduction of railroads. Institutional uncer-
tainty generated such a risky environment for investment that it limited 
the prívate sector from undertaking it. Institutional weakness made govern-
ment unable to actively promote railroad construction. Additionally, it made 
governments unable to provide security on the roads, and widespread ban-
ditry further increased transpwrtation costs. We can blame institutional frag-
mentation for the existence of inter-state taríff barriers that added to those 
transportation costs that resulted from nature. Even though the nation 
would gain by abolishing inter-state taríff barriers, federal governments 
were not strong enough —either fiscally and miÜtarily— to impose the 
national good over that of regional interest groups that profited from these 
taxes. They were unable to coordinate a general removal of alcabalas that 
would help individual states surmount the «free-ríder» problem, that would 
occur if each separately eliminated them. State governments poorly deve-
loped tax collection systems could not substitute alcabalas with other taxes 
that would allow greater economic growth. Alcabalas continued to exist 
until 1896 severely reducing market sizes accessible to firms. 
These factors not only limited the levéis of growth and technological 
change the industry experienced, but also shaped it in a peculiar way: 
it grew geographically dispersed. By 1879 there existed cotton milis in prac-
tically all the states of the Republic. This contrasts with the way the cotton 
textile industry developed both in the United States and in the United 
Kingdom. High transportation costs, a product of nature and of insecuríty 
on the roads and alcabalas, generated a fragmented market that inhibited 
the Mexican textile industry from locating in the región that offered com-
parative advantages. The geographically dispersed nature of the industry 
Marichal(1997), p. 119. 
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might have also prevented that the extemalities that accrue from a «big 
push» develop as diey would have done otherwise. 
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